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Balancing Conscience: A Response to 
Fernandes & Ecret*
Abstract
There are many lessons that bioethics can learn from the Holocaust. Forefront are 
the lessons from the Nuremberg trials and the formation of research ethics. An often-
overlooked lesson is how the Nazi regime was able to construct a hierarchy in such a way 
that influenced people to act in horrendous ways. Fernandes & Ecret, writing in Conatus 
– Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 2 (2019), highlight the influence of hierarchy on the moral 
silence of nurses and physicians within the Nazi regime. While we greatly enjoyed the 
paper, and think it is an important contribution, we find several misrepresentations of 
current bioethical discourse. There is not a global acceptance of euthanasia or medical 
aid in dying, the contemporary position in bioethics does not favor removal of conscience-
based protections, and the lack of personal conscience-based protections was not the 
main factor in the analysis of Nazi medical hierarchy. The authors’ overall conclusion 
that their analysis suggests the importance of strengthening personal conscience-based 
objections to prevent medical hierarchy from influencing immoral behavior misses the 
more significant issue of institutional behavior. Instead, we argue, that the lessons from 
the analysis of Nazi nurses and physicians speak to the importance of protecting patients 
from institutional conscience-based objections that violate patient rights of access to 
legal medical services. This paper will respond to the misrepresentations. We highlight 
the growing threats to health care access from religious affiliated institutions, the threats 
to professional ethics and physician and nurse scope of practice. We conclude that 
the analysis by Fernandes & Ecret does point out an important lesson, but rather than 
showing the importance of individual conscience protections, it speaks to the importance 
of protecting patient rights.
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We read with great interest “The Effect of Hierarchy on Moral Silence in Healthcare: What Can the Holocaust Teach Us?” by Fernandes & Ecret, which presents a powerful and important 
discussion of hierarchy and moral silence in healthcare.1 In the article, the 
authors highlight the dangers of silence in the face of ethical violations, 
encourage the moral voices of nurses and physicians, and believe the 
lessons of the Shoah should be better materialized in professional 
education. We agree!
The authors primarily hypothesize how ingrained hierarchy had a 
role in shaping moral actions during the Holocaust. They are right that 
it is foolish to ignore these lessons, giving way to the complacency that 
it couldn’t happen here or now. We agree that hierarchy of the Nazi 
regime worked to ensure physicians and nurses stayed silent and were 
complicit. We, however, challenge the authors’ concluding assumptions 
that:
i. there is a global acceptance of euthanasia and assisted suicide 
in the “medical profession” for conditions such as depression, 
schizophrenia, autism, addiction, and transgenderism.
ii. “contemporary” literature in bioethics favors removal of 
conscience protection laws.
iii. lack of individual conscience protections was the main factor in 
complicit behavior in the Shoah. 
The authors conclude that these assumptions support the argument 
for strengthening individual provider conscience protections against 
the dangers of medical hierarchy, preventing moral silence. Ensuring 
protections are important. The more prescient threat is not medical 
hierarchy but religious affiliated organizations holding institutional 
conscience-based refusals against offering medical services. 
Hospitals that hold restrictive conscience-objections prohibit 
staff from providing or discussing care with their patients. The US 
government, instead of strengthening patient protections, is seeking to 
expand protections for those entities.2 
We will address our criticism of the three assumptions that Fernandes 
& Ecret base their conclusion on. We will then show how the lessons 
1 Ashley K. Fernandes, and DiAnn Ecret, “The Effect of Hierarchy on Moral Silence in Health-
care: What Can the Holocaust Teach Us ?” Conatus - Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 2 (2019): 
21-43.
2 Ian D. Wolfe, and Thaddeus M. Pope, “Hospital Mergers and Conscience-Based Objections 
– Growing Threats to Access and Quality of Care,” The New England Journal of Medicine 382 
(2020): 1388-1389.
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from Fernandes & Ecret’s analysis seem to point towards the dangers 
of an institution setting a specific conscience and overriding clinician 
conscience and ethics against the rights of patients. 
Assumption Ι
Assisted suicide, now referred to as medical aid in dying (MAID), is fairly 
accepted in some medical professions, but there is by no means “global” 
acceptance.3 Although MAID is certainly gaining momentum, it is legal in 
only seven US jurisdictions, for limited indications, and a rigorous process for 
access.4 The American Medical Association still considers it “fundamentally 
incompatible with the physician’s role.”5 The American Nurses Association 
only recently changed their policy around MAID that recognizes it as a legal 
and ethical right, highlights the obligation of the nurse to support their 
patient in that choice and through the process, but still maintain that nurses 
are ethically prohibited from administering medications for that purpose.6 
Further, euthanasia, which is different and distinct from MAID, remains illegal 
in the United States, and most other countries. One or two instances in 
history do not equate to accepted practice. 
Assumption ΙΙ
The authors’ claim that contemporary bioethical literature supports 
removal of conscience protection laws is false and is a mischaracterization 
of this debate. The authors misrepresent Stahl & Emmanuel’s argument by 
claiming it called for an end to conscience protection laws.7 The argument 
Stahl & Emmanuel make is that a clinician should not be allowed to utilize 
conscience protection laws to violate a patient’s right to access of a 
legal and medically accepted treatment, particularly when the clinician is 
federally funded or practices in an organization that receives public funds. 
Patient rights must be the primary concern. Clinicians with conscience-
based objections have a duty to disclose this to their employer so they can 
accommodate patient access.
3 Bob Roehr, “Assisted Dying in US and Canada: Controversy Subsides after Legalization,” The 
British Medical Journal 360 (2018): k503.
4 Thaddeus M. Pope, “Legal History of Medical Aid in Dying: Physician assisted Death in US 
Courts and Legislatures,” New Mexico Law Review 48, no. 2 (2018): 267.
5 American Medical Association, “Physician-Assisted Suicide,” November 14, 2016, https://
www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/physician-assisted-suicide
6 ANA Ethics Advisory Board, “ANA Position Statement: The Nurse’s Role When a Patient Re-
quests Medical Aid in Dying,” The Online Journal of Issues in Nursing 24, no. 3 (2019).
7 Ronit Y. Stahl, and Ezekiel J. Emanuel, “Physicians, not Conscripts-Conscientious Objection in 
Health Care,” The New England Journal of Medicine 376, no. 14 (2017): 1380-1385.
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Savulescu & Schuklenk make a similarly nuanced argument that speaks 
to the importance of the discussion.8 While they do call for an end to 
conscience protection laws, they do so by demonstrating that objections 
are often better grounded in professional codes of ethics and scope of 
practice provisions. Their point, we believe, is not to silence professionals, 
but rather to protect patients by putting the focus on individual patient 
rights before a right to conscience-based objections by clinicians. Their 
approach puts the burden onto the clinicians, who have more power than a 
patient, by requiring them to base their objection in professional practice and 
code of ethics rather than the more ambiguous reference to “conscience.” 
We believe that individual conscience-based objections are a legitimate 
and necessary moral exercise but that careful balance is needed to ensure 
that patient rights are not overridden by the same type of mistaken medical 
morality that led to faulty medical ethics by the Nationalist Socialists in 
Nazi Germany. 
There are certainly bioethicists calling for removal of individual 
conscience objections, but not all.9 The debate in bioethics is not one 
of consensus for blanket removal of conscience protections rather it is 
more nuanced and is over the balance between patient access to legal and 
professionally accepted care and respect for the individual conscience of 
their healthcare provider in order to avoid morally tenuous scenarios. 
Assumption III
Fernandes & Ecret’s conclusion that the Nazi regime indoctrinated 
physicians and nurses to act immorally provides an important and valuable 
lesson. It does speak to an element of individual conscience protections. 
However, we believe that discussion of hierarchy and moral silence by health 
professionals in the Nazi regime is more aptly analogized to the dangers of 
institutional conscience-based protections and institutional power, namely 
that a hierarchal structure such as a hospital can force its ideological beliefs 
on the community it serves, even coopting employees as morally apathetic 
agents of that hierarchy. Nazi physician’s and nurse’s individual objections 
were not made because they were willful participants in the regime’s belief 
structure. 
Institutional conscience protections allow healthcare institutions to 
decline provision of certain services based on their mission and values, even 
8 Julian Savulescu, and Udo Schuklenk, “Doctors have no Right to Refuse Medical Assistance in 
Dying, Abortion or Contraception,” Bioethics 31, no. 3 (2017): 162-170. 
9 Mark R. Wicclair, “Is Conscientious Objection Incompatible with a Physician’s Professional 
Obligations?” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29, no. 3 (2008): 171-185.
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if such therapies are considered medically indicated. Institutional conscience 
protections are widely supported by both federal and state laws.10 
Fernandes & Ecret’s arguments make the case for why institutions 
should not promote a particular “conscience” that might override individual 
conscience. This becomes particularly important, and relevant, when 
individual hospitals can promote conscience-based objections. Hospital 
conscience-based objections interfere with patients’ rights to standard and 
legally authorized treatments similar to the way in which the Nazi regime 
reduced the rights of segments of the population, ensuring compliance from 
their clinicians. 
I. Institutional Conscience
Individual conscience protections do not seem to have been the problem in 
the Holocaust, they could have spoken up, likely would have been punished. 
The absence of these laws does not seem to have been the main culprit in 
getting clinicians to act out their bidding. Rather, their analysis highlights 
the dangers being a part of a collective entity that encroaches on the rights 
of those they are supposed to serve in the name of an institutional belief 
structure, engaging in group think and moral silence. Fernandes & Ecret are 
correct that nurses and physicians have an obligation to speak up against 
institutional practices they conscientiously and morally object to. 
Clinicians who many find themselves working in a, for instance, Catholic 
health care facility, are not constrained by objections to care, but rather 
they are constrained by the inability to provide care.11 These are problems of 
institutional restrictions to care, the provider can voice their objection about 
a hospital not providing a legal medical service, but the patient still suffers a 
denial of rights, delays in care, and sometimes inadequate treatment. In fact, 
in some facilities a clinician cannot even counsel or advise a patient on how 
to access a service outside of the institution without a risk of employment 
violations.12
Fernandes & Ecret present an important and powerful analysis. But 
their analysis supports the conclusion that patient rights and protections 
are paramount. The ethical violations of Nazi physicians and nurses was not 
10 Nadia N. Sawicki, “Protections from Civil Liability in State Abortion Conscience Laws,” Jour-
nal of the American Medical Association 322, no. 19 (2019): 1918-1920.
11 Maryam Guiahi, “Catholic Health Care and Women’s Health,” Obstetrics and Gynecology 
131, no. 3 (2018): 534-537.
12 Debra B. Stulberg, Rebecca A. Jackson, and Lori R. Freedman, “Referrals for Services Prohib-
ited in Catholic Health Care Facilities,” Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health 48, no. 
3 (2016): 111-117.
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a failure of conscience-based protections but a violation, by omission and 
commission, of people because of the “conscience” of the institution, or 
regime. They were complicit while the rights of those they were supposed to 
serve were reduced and eliminated. It is faulty to believe that one could have 
achieved justice through conscience protections in a wholly unjust society.
The reason this distinction is important, and why these lessons are 
relevant today is that conscience-based objections in healthcare have risen 
to the level of social discussion. However, there is a distinction that is 
getting lost in the discourse. This distinction is between the conscience of an 
individual clinician (nurse, physician) and the conscience of an entity such as a 
hospital (institutional conscience). 
II. The Balance of Conscience and Rights
The balance between conscience and rights has been shifting in the US, 
as Catholic hospitals are merging with and acquiring hospitals around 
the country.13 Problematic institutional consciences are not isolated to 
religiously-affiliated hospitals, this is our point. They are only currently 
emblematic of the dangers around allowing institutions to push particularly 
restrictive belief structures. One could imagine a secular institution 
employing some other restrictive conscience. As major policy initiatives 
are being attempted through the expansion of federal conscience rules that 
would expand what services and to whom services can be denied.14 These 
policies favor institutional conscience over that of patient rights to access 
basic, standard, and legally accepted healthcare services, even when their 
own insurance policies allow for access. A clinician should maintain the right 
to refuse participation in controversial procedures, but not ones considered 
basic or urgent care. Institutional conscience policies also place physicians 
and nurses in a compromising position, one that can lead to moral distress in 
the face of concerns for employment violations.15 This becomes the problem 
that Fernandes & Ecret warn of, institutional silencing of individual morals 
and professional codes of ethics leading to the harm of patients.
The shift towards institutional conscience protections also impacts the 
professional ethics of the clinical staff within the organization, just as Fernandes 
& Ecret detail in their account of Nazi physicians and nurses. While the authors 
13 Maryam Guiahi, “Religious Refusals to Long-Acting Reversible Contraceptives in Catholic 
Settings: A Call for Evidence,” American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 222, no. 4 
(2019): S869.e1-S872.e5.
14 Lawrence O. Gostin, “The ‘Conscience’ Rule: How will it affect Patients’ Access to Health 
Services?” Journal of the American Medical Association 321, no. 22 (2019): 2152-2153.
15 Guiahi, “Religious Refusals,” S870.
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make the argument that the lessons of the Shoah speak to the importance of 
individual conscience protections for physicians and nurses, we believe the more 
compelling and prescient argument is the protection of patients, and citizens, 
from institutional power. If hospitals have more power over patients, patients’ 
rights may be violated, even making nurses and physicians complicit. The balance 
is recognizing the rights and responsibilities in both patients and clinicians 
without overly endowing power to the institution. The lessons from the Shoah, 
in Fernandes & Ecret’s analysis, are that moral silence is unjust and institutional 
power needs to be checked. Individual clinician conscience regulations are too 
easily corrupted by institutional power. Without the dissolution of institutional 
conscience protections or the acceptance of conscientious provision protections, 
institutions will have too much power over patients and clinicians, and it is likely 
that history will sadly continue to repeat itself.
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